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ABSTRACT
The New-Keynesian aggregate supply derives from micro-foundations an inflation-dynamics model
very much like the tradition in the monetary literature. Inflation is primarily affected by: (i)
economic slack; (ii) expectations; (iii) supply shocks; and (iv) inflation persistence.  This paper
extends the New Keynesian aggregate supply relationship to include also fluctuations in potential
output, as an additional determinant of the relationship. Implications for monetary rules and to the
estimation of the Phillips curve are pointed out.
Assaf Razin









  The New Keynsian aggregate supply relationship typically links inflation surprises 
with fluctuations in the output gap, but there is no independent role for the fluctuations in 
potential output. Based on such construct, micro-based monetary rules do not have the   
potential output as target; the monetary rules’ targets are exclusively  inflation rates and 
output gaps. 
 
Another branch in the inflation literature is concerned with the long-term level of 
potential output. The literature points out to the  long run costs of inflation, based on some 
cross-country evidence. Findings point to some threshold effects in the relationship between 
inflation and growth. Consequently, above certain country-specific inflation thresholds, 
growth is negatively affected by mean inflation. [e.g., see Barro (1995) and Khan and 
Senhadji (2001)].  However, this long run channel through which monetary policy affect 
potential output is not considered in this paper.  Rather, the paper demonstrates how to bring 
the potential output into the aggregate supply relationship, by incorporating the effects of 
investment in capacity on aggregate supply. 
 
The analysis is conducted in an optimization-based “New Keynesian”  framework,  
a la Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), employing the analytical tools in the lucid exposition of 
Woodford (2003). Specifically, the model features imperfect competition in the product 
market, in which the producers mark up output prices over marginal costs, and also mark 
down wages below the marginal productivity of labor. We thus derive a version of the Mark-
ups of prices over wages in our model which turn out to be counter-cyclical – a very 
pronounced phenomenon in the European markets, as noted by Cohen and Farhi (2001).  
They note that “European firms in bad times manage to keep the prices high, while their US 
counterparts are pressed into cuts and discounts of various forms.”  This is why the product 
market version of the Phillips curve (i.e., the relation between inflation and the output gap), 
in Europe, seems to be relatively more stable empirically than the labor market version (i.e., 
the relation between wage growth and unemployment).  3 
 
Evidently, the equilibrium relation between inflation and excess capacity is 
significantly influenced by the degree of competition in the product market.  A key feature of 
such an equilibrium is the degree of strategic interactions between firms that set their prices 
ex ante and other domestic and foreign firms that set their prices so as to clear the markets ex 
post.  This market-organization feature determines in turn the degree of price stickiness.  
 
Understanding why nominal changes have real consequences (why a short run 
aggregate supply relationship exists) has long been a central concern of macroeconomic 
research.  Lucas (1973) proposes a model in which the effect arises because agents in the 
economy are unable to distinguish perfectly between aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks.  He 
tests this model at the aggregate level by showing that the Phillips curve is steeper in 
countries with more variable aggregate maximal demand.  Following Lucas, Ball, Mankiw, 
and Romer (1988) show that sticky-price Keynesian models predict that the Phillips curve 
should be steeper in countries with higher average rates of inflation and that this prediction 
too receives empirical support. Loungani, Razin, and Yuen (2001), and Razin and Yuen 
(2001)  show that both Lucas’s and Ball-Mankiw-Romer’s estimates of the Phillips curve 
slope depend on the degree of capital account restrictions.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.  Section 2 lays out the New-
Keynesian analytical framework.  Section 3 derives the aggregate supply relationship. 
Section 4 concludes with implications of the aggregate supply relationship to optimising 
monetary rules, and to the empirical literature. 
 
 
2 The  Analytical  Framework 
 
Consider a closed economy with a representative household that is endowed with a 
continuum of goods-specific skills – uniformly distributed on the unit interval [0, 1] – to be 
supplied to a differentiated product industry.  As a consumer, the representative household 
has access to consumption of both domestic goods (distributed on [0, 1]). The household 
seeks to maximize a discounted sum of expected utilities: 
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where β is the subjective discount factor, C is the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) index of household 
consumption,  P the Dixit-Stiglitz price index, M/P the demand for real balances, ξ a 
preference shock, and h(j) the supply of type-j labor to the production of good of variety j.  
As usual, we define the consumption index and its corresponding price index respectively as 
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where c(j) represents domestic consumption of the jth good, and p(j) the domestic-currency 
price of  c(j).  The elasticity of substitution among the different goods is θ>1 and  the number 
of goods that are produced is equal to 1. 
 
For our purpose, the relevant utility-maximizing conditions include an intra-temporal 
condition for the choice of labor supply of type j: 
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whre r
t is the real rate of interest in period.  As in the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model, demand for 
good j satisfies 
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The production function assumes the form 
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where At is a random labor-augmenting productivity shock.  We follow Woodford (2003, 
chapter 5) and assume (for tractability) that there is a separate capital stock, kt(j), for each 
good, rather than a single rental market for capital services that each producer has access to. 
 
Investment spending is in the amount 
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where the function I[⋅] is a convex function, as in the standard investment cost-of-adjustment 
textbooks. 
 
It(j) represents purchases by producer j of a Dixit-Stiglitz composite good: 
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For simplicity, the elasticity of substitution, θ is the same as in the case of consumption 
purchases.  The variable cost of supplying yt(j) is  ( ) ( ) [ ] j k j y f w t t t /
1 − ,  
which implies a (real) marginal cost of 
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By using equation (2), we can replace the real wage above by the marginal rate of 
substitution.  Imposing symmetry across firms (so that we can drop the index j), the above 
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2.1 Price  Setting 
 
Firms are monopolistically competitive in the goods markets, and each one of them behaves 
like a monopson in the labor market (with producer j as the sole demander for labor of type-
j).  A fraction γ of the monopolistically competitive firms sets their prices flexibly at p1t, 
supplying y1t; whereas the remaining fraction 1 - γ sets their prices one period in advance (in 
period t – 1) at p2t, supplying y2t.  In the former case, the price is marked up above the 
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In the latter case, p2t will be chosen to maximize expected discounted profit 
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where we have used the inverse demand function from equation (4) for y2t and the inverse 
production function for ht.  One can show that p2t satisfies 
 







































θ  (6b) 7 
 
This condition has an intuitive interpretation.  In the special case of perfect certainty, this is 
nothing but a standard equation describing price as a mark-up over marginal cost like 
equation  (6a).  With uncertainty, it can be interpreted as a weighted average of price mark-
ups over marginal cost.  This expected value is equal to zero.  With price-pre-setting, the firm 
is committed to supply according to the realized demand.  Hence, the realization of shocks 





Our model predicts that the mark-ups of the producers who pre-set their prices will be 
counter-cyclical.  Negative demand shocks will induce the flex-price firms to adjust their 
prices downward, attracting demand away from, and thus lowering the marginal costs and 
jacking up the price mark-ups, of fix-price firms. 
 
Given p1t and p2t, the aggregate price index in equation (1) can be rewritten as: 
 










2.2  The Labor Market 
 
The market for each type of goods-specific skill of labor service is characterized by workers 
as wage-takers and producers as wage-makers, as in the monopsony case.  Figure 1 describes 
equilibrium in one such market.  The downward-sloping,  marginal-productivity curve,  is the 
demand for labor.  Supply of labor, Sh, is implicitly determined by the utility-maximizing 
condition for h, i.e., see equation (2).  The upward-sloping marginal factor cost curve is the 
marginal cost change from the producer point of view. It lies above the supply curve because, 
                                                 
1    Woodford (2003) assumes the Calvo price-setting framework. He derives a aggregate supply block, 
consisting with multiple dynamic equations.  Our assumed price setting framework yields a single-
equation aggregate supply relationship.  This simple form focuses attention on the coefficient of the 
potential output variable in the aggregate supply relationship. 8 
in order to elicit more hours of work, the producer has to offer a higher wage not only to that 
(marginal) hour but also to all the (inra-marginal) existing hours.  Equilibrium employment 
occurs at a point where the marginal factor costs is equal to the marginal productivity.   
Equilibrium wage is given by B, with the worker'’ real wage marked down below her 
marginal product by a distance AB.
2 
 
Full employment obtains because workers are offered a wage according to their supply 
schedule.  This is why our Phillips curve will be stated in terms of excess capacity (product 
market version) rather than unemployment (labor market version). 
 
In fact, the model can also accommodate unemployment by introducing a labor union, which 
has monopoly power to bargain on behalf of the workers with the monopsonistic firms over 
the equilibrium wage.  In such case, the equilibrium wage will lie somewhere between Sh and 
M Ph, and unemployment can arise – so that the labor market version of the Phillips curve 
can be derived as well.  To simplify the analysis, we assume in this paper that the workers are 
wage-takers. 
 
                                                 
2   In the limiting case where the producers behave perfectly competitive in the labor market, the real wage 
becomes equal to the marginal productivity of labor and the marginal cost of labor curve is not sensitive to 
output changes.  Thus, with a constant mark-up 
1 − θ
θ , the Phillips curve becomes flat, i.e., no relation 
exists between inflation and excess capacity. 9 













Profit maximization by producer j yields a first-order condition for investment  
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where, q is the shadow value (because there is not any  rental market) of an additional unit of 
capital.
3  It is written in a Bellman-like equation as follows. 
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Note that if a rental market were to exist,  qt(j)  in equation (7) will be equal to the marginal 
productivity of capital, as expected. 
 
 
                                                 
3   See Woodford (2003, chapter 5). 10 
2.4 Potential  Output 
 
Potential output is defined as the price-flexible level of output. In the case where all prices 
are fully flexible (i.e., γ =1), output will attain its natural level, 
n
t Y , implicitly defined by 
 













3.  Aggregate Supply and Investment 
 
  This section derives the aggregate supply relationship. It has its roots in the 
expectations-augmented Phillips curve of the kind hypothesized by Friedman (1968) and 
Phelps (1970) for both closed and open economies.  [see also Ball, Mankiw, and Romer 
(1988) and Roberts (1995).] 
 
  In order to obtain a tractable solution, we log-linearize the equilibrium conditions 
around the steady state. In the steady state ξt = 0 and At = Ā.  We assume that β(1+r) = 1 and 










 ~  as the proportional deviation of any variable xt from its deterministic steady 
state value x .  We can then log-linearize the model equations around the deterministic steady 
state equilibrium. 
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where, 11 
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Log-linearizing the two price-setting equations  ( ) ( ) [ ] b a 6 , 6 , the investment rule, [equation  
(7)], and using equation (8), yields: 
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Define, as standard, the inflation rate by,  ( ) 1 / ln − = t t t P P π  so that 
() () () t t t t t t P E P E log log 1 1 − − − = − π π . 
Equations (6a’) and (6b’) can be combined to obtain the link between inflation surprise, and 

















































Real marginal costs increase with a rise in  the current level of economic activity; thus, they 
are  affected by fluctuations in the aggregate capital stock and investment demand. 
Consequently, the fluctuations in investment and the capital stock are negatively correlated 
with surprise inflation, holding constant the output gap.  
 
4.  Aggregate Supply and Potential Output  12 
Potential output is defined as the hypothetical output level that would result if prices and 
wages are completely flexible but other distortions, like taxes and imperfect competition, are  
left in place. That is potential output is normally lower than the efficient output level (the 
Pareto-optimal output level). 
The level of potential output, 
n
n Y , is solved implicitly from: 
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Log-linearizing the equation and rearranging yields: 
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is a shock term.  
 
Rearranging terms in equation (10), and substituting the resulting relationship into equation 
(9) yields the aggregate supply relationship we are seeking, as follows. 
 
Equation (11) demonstrates that the fluctuations in potential output are negatively correlated 























































π π (11) 13 
gap.  This means that the inflation-output tradeoff is three-dimensional: among inflation 
output gaps and potential output. 
In the absence of investment, however, the aggregate supply relationship reduces to the 
conventional relationship between surprise inflation and the output gap: 
 
Therefore the inflation-output trade-off becomes two-dimensional: between inflation rates 
and output gaps. 
 
 
4.   Conclusion 
The New-Keynesian aggregate supply derives from micro-foundations an inflation-dynamics 
model very much like the tradition in the monetary literature. Inflation is primarily affected 
by: (i) economic slack; (ii) expectations; (iii) supply shocks; and (iv) inflation persistence.  
This paper extends the New Keynesian aggregate supply relationship to include also 
fluctuations in potential output, as an additional determinant of the relationship.  
 
Should potential output become a target variable for central banks? Should 
central banks respond to potential output? 
 
First, one has to be clear what "target variable" and "responding" means. 
The most useful definition of "targeting" a variable is that the variable is a 
"target variable" in the sense that it is an argument in the loss function 
to be minimized (and the loss function is increasing in the distance between 
the target variable and the "target level" for the variable). There is another use  
of  "targeting a variable" as meaning "responding to a variable," where the latter means that 
the variable in question is an argument in the reaction function that represents the equilibrium 































π π (12) 14 
relation between the loss function and the corresponding optimal reaction 
function (the reaction function that minimizes the loss function) is complex 
and typically not one-to-one. What enter in the loss function are the target 
variables. What enter into the reaction function are the determinants of 
(the forecasts of) the target variables, that is, the predetermined 
variables that describe the state of the economy. Typically, a target 
variable enters the reaction function only if the variable is also a 
predetermined state variable (which it is in some models). Also, the 
coefficients in the reaction function are complex and not monotonic 
functions of the parameters of the loss function and the rest of the model. 
 
Thus, should potential output be a target variable, in the sense of 
independently entering into the loss function?  In the presence of capital goods in the model, 
the answer could be that potential output could  enter as a separate argument,  and also to the 
extent that it enters into the output gap. 
That is, the output gap should be one of the target variables (with a zero 
target level, meaning that the target for output is potential output).  
In practice,  though, monetary policy probably have a rather complex  
effect on potential output even in the short run. Thus,  any attempt to start 
systematically affect potential output, for instance, attempting to increase 
it towards the Pareto optimal level of output , could  lead down the inflation-bias 
lane of  Kydland-Prescott and Barro-Gordon. Other  policies than monetary 
policy, like fiscal policies, structural policies that reduce regulatory barriers and improve 
competition, or subsidies to research, training and education, seem to be  better 








The framework of analysis that could give an answer to these questions could usefully  be the 
one pursued by  Woodford (2003), who  skilfully reduces a dynamic optimization problem of 15 
the choice of the desired monetary rule, based on the representative consumer’s welfare, into 
a linear-quadratic optimization problem. Extending this framework to an analysis of the 
interactions between monetary and fiscal policies, Benigno and Woodford (2003)), the 
constrained-efficient allocation is achieved when output is equal to the would be price-flex 
no-wedge distortions level, with a zero price dispersion (or other costs of inflation), and real 
value of the initial government nominal debt equal to the deterministic steady state real debt. 
In the broader-scoped framework that is specified in this paper, A conjectured quadratic-
linear optimal problem, is to minimize a carefully derived loss function, subject to three 
constraints: (1) Aggregate- supply relationship; (2) Government debt dynamics, and 3) the 
dynamic low governing the potential accumulation of the stock of capital. The conjectured 
loss function is  the discounted value of a weighted sum of squared deviations of inflation 
from a zero level (so as to minimize distorting price dispersion among firms of identical 
technologies and demand schedules), the squared deviations in output from target output, and 
the level of the output target.  The target output level is likely to be different from potential 
output under monopolistic competition because of the existence of a wedge between the 
marginal productivity of labor and the leisure/consumption marginal rate of substitution.  
My intuition is that since this paper demonstrates that potential output improves the inflation-
output gap trade-off, the task of the monetary authority, which trades off inflation and output 
gaps is facilitated if they target potential output, as well as the inflation fluctuations and the 
output gaps. Therefore, a Taylor-like interest rule which targets not only the fluctuations in 
inflation rates and output gaps, but also the fluctuations in potential output is bound to raise 
the measure of consumer. 
The broader-scope aggregate supply that is derived in this paper has also implications for the 
empirical literature. The New Keynesian Phillips curve has attracted renewed interest also in 
much of the empirical research. Gali and Gertler (1999) and Gali, Gertler and Lopez-
Salida(2001) present evidence that US and Europe inflation dynamics are consistent with a 
variant of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve. Potential output plays a role in the analysis 
only to the extent that it is needed to measure the output gap. Thus, the revised version of the 
aggregate supply relationship, which includes potential output as one of the inflation-output 
trade-off’s determinants has an obvious implication for the empirical literature, as well.  A 
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